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In this article important issues of legitimacy of government and
external interference in the affairs of a State are raised. As a prelimi-
nary, the rights and obligations of a State with regard to territorial
integrity and sovereignty are considered, prior to analyses of the
emergent concept of the responsibility to protect and the principle of
self-determination. The article then takes into account events of the
Arab Spring, before the author concludes by drawing lessons for
States, not only those whose people look to change their own govern-
ments, or style of governments, but also those intent on intervention
in third States.
I. INTRODUCTION
Responsibility to protect is a concept that has grown in momentum
over the last decade or so. It is one perceived to be necessary in a world
where concern for human rights and humanitarian affairs has become all-
consuming and perhaps paramount.' Yet it is one fraught with dangers, both
for those "benefiting" from the concept and those who have undertaken the
burden of it.
As a concept, responsibility to protect may be seen to sit at the cusp of
and act as a hinge to internal self-determination, on the one hand, and exter-
nal self-determination, on the other. Self-determination itself is "the right of
a people to determine its own political destiny." 2 Internal self-determination
is perhaps best seen as the right of a people to govern through autonomy,3
* Dr Rob Dickinson is a Lecturer in Law at Newcastle Law School, Newcastle
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NEI 7RU, England, UK, email:
rob.dickinson@ncl.ac.uk.
1. COSTAs DoUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AT
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 374 (2000): "Human rights have become the raison d'tre
of the state system." This can be seen to be evidenced and brought home by the increas-
ing number of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in existence and
their increasing participation in the international arena: see in this context, for example,
DAVID ARMSTRONG, THEO FARRELL, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 168 (2009).
2. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 574 (4th ed. 2010).
3. Id.; See also PAUL GROARKE, DIVIDING THE STATE: LEGITIMACY, SECESSION
AND THE DOCTRINE OF OPPRESSION 84 (2004); ANToNIo CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINA-
TION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 350-51 (1995). Internal self-determination
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whereas the logical extreme of external self-determination is secession, sep-
aration from the State,4 but it is also a right to non-intervention in the inter-
nal affairs of States.5
This article proceeds to consider rights and obligations of a State with
reference to territorial integrity and sovereignty, including obligations with
reference to the human rights of its people. 6 It goes on to examine the bur-
geoning doctrine of the responsibility to protect and how it came into being,
before analysing the principle of self-determination. Finally, the article
looks at events of the Arab Spring, commencing in 2011 and moving up to
the present day. It draws lessons for States, not only those whose people
look to change their own governments, or indeed style of governments, but
also those intent on intervention, especially the USA and those of the Euro-
pean Union, the latter being committed to intervention for purposes of hu-
manitarian relief.7
can be understood as "[A] people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state." Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [19981 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126 (Can.).
4. Although, it is worth recalling that secession is not in itself a right of interna-
tional law, or, more specifically, of self-determination: Georg Nolte, Secession and ex-
ternal intervention, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 65, 84 (Marcelo
G. Kohen ed., 2006); See also Reference re Secession, supra note 3, at para. 126, and
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217,
at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of International Law]
("The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or inte-
gration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determina-
tion by that people."). This is indicative of the potential characteristics of external self-
determination.
5. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6. If a State should fail in this regard the international community may, it appears,
question its territorial integrity. See Declaration on Principles of International Law,
supra note 4, at p. 124: the Declaration provides that nothing therein "shall be construed
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." See
also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, The Commission establishes
humanitarian presence in Tripoli and boosts funding for emergency operations in
Libya's capital (Aug. 29, 2011) ("The European Commission . . . deployed to Tripoli a
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II. SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
The concept of "sovereignty" as understood today represents the en-
tirety of international rights and duties that are recognized by international
law to be residing in "an independent territorial unit," or the State. In es-
sence, therefore, sovereignty is a description of statehood,8 and the criteria
of statehood are laid down by international law.9 By Article I of the Monte-
video Convention on Rights and Duties of States, "[t]he State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a perma-
nent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to
enter into relations with other States." 0 These four criteria, while not neces-
sarily exhaustive, tend to be adopted in substance by jurists," and reflect
"sovereignty."
multi-sectoral team of humanitarian experts and ... opened a humanitarian office in the
Libyan capital.").
8. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32
(2d ed. 2006); see also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, at 180 (April 11). Indeed, only States can
be sovereign; See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINA-
TION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 15 (rev. ed. 1996). However,
sovereignty is not only a description of statehood, and there are various ways in which
the term "sovereignty" (which for many scholars means more than "the State") is used;
See, e.g., ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
14-22 (1986). New lines of thought on the issue of sovereignty have opened up as
sovereignty has been transformed, for example, in the EU States. Questions arise as to
whether sovereign States may mutate into post-sovereign States, whether sovereignty
may survive within the compass of the EU or, perhaps more particularly, within the
compass of the Eurozone, or survive devolution of power, for example within the UK.
In that context issues of subsidiarity become apparent, as do issues of the politics of
identity; See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND
NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 191-92, 198 (1999) (arguing for a new
order transcending the sovereign State, and in turn weakening the concept of exclusive
territoriality, the idea as a whole developing out of the broad idea of subsidiarity); but
see NEIL WALKER, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRAN-
SITION 3, 31 (2003) (emphasis in original) (arguing that, in what is a post-Westphalian
phase of sovereignty, although there are pressures on sovereignty, it is necessary to
conceive of new political values and virtues flourishing "through the operation of sov-
ereignty," not in its absence).
9. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (7th ed. 2008).
10. Convention of Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
11. See BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 70.
932013-2014]
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Sovereignty is inextricably linked with the concept of "territorial integ-
rity." 2 As evidenced by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, both con-
cepts are peremptory norms of international law.' 3 Article 2(1) reads: "The
organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Mem-
bers," while Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."' 4
More than a century ago, Opperheim wrote, "[s]ince the Law of Na-
tions is a law between States only and exclusively, States only and exclu-
sively are subjects of the Law of Nations." 5 This view, though, has
gradually changed over the intervening years. As the international legal or-
der has evolved, international law has become more than Oppenheim recog-
nized in 1905. Today, international law does not exclusively involve States,
and it is not the case that States only are subjects of international law. Inter-
national law now recognizes community or collective interests through such
means as the prohibition of torture and genocide. It is through this recogni-
tion of collective interests that we can see exposed recognition of many of
the contemporary problems in international law and indeed recognition of
collective interests may contribute to those problems.
12. See, e.g., Xianfa, pmbl. (1982) (China); see also Wouter G. Werner, Self-De-
termination and Civil War 6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 171, 173 & n. 9 (2001). While
sovereignty is generally associated with the territory of a State, Cezary Mik distin-
guishes it from the principle of territorial integrity in the context of extradition and
asylum; Cezary Mik, State Sovereignty and European Integration: Public International
Law, EU Law and Constitutional Law in the Polish Context, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRAN-
SITION, supra note 8, at 367, 377-78.
13. Certain overriding principles of international law exist, forming a body of jus
cogens, rules, rights or duties that may be termed fundamental, inalienable or inherent.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 510; accord Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 53, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331(stating that "[ffor the purposes of the present
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character"); See also CRAWFORD, supra note
8, at 100-01, 127, 447. Nevertheless, not only are sovereignty and territorial integrity
peremptory norms of international law, so arguably is the right to self-determination,
the principle of which is recognized by international law. However, while external self-
determination may be seen as a peremptory norm, this is not the case with internal self-
determination, and, for example, in any event a State may give away power to exploit
natural resources within its territory.
14. U.N. Charter, art. 2, paras. 1, 4.
15. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 289 (1905).
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The crux of the matter is that States not only have rights in interna-
tional law - rights, for example, of sovereign equality and of territorial in-
tegrity - but States also have obligations. Obligations not only extend to
refraining from interfering against the territorial integrity of another State
but also extend to protecting human rights within the State' 6 and to protect-
ing human rights of those in other States. These issues are all relevant in the
context of the Arab Spring.
So far as an ever-expanding body of human rights obligations are con-
cerned, the international human rights movement gained momentum at the
end of the Second World War. Human rights were emphasized by the 1945
United Nations Charter, whereby the peoples of the United Nations deter-
mined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small."' 7 The UN Charter makes various references to
human rights, though these references are essentially aspirational rather
than substantive.' 8 Indeed, the aspirational nature of human rights is partic-
ularly visible with reference to the events of the Arab Spring.
Set against the background of what is now a vast number of human
rights bodies are the two principal human rights treaties: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)'9 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).20 The essen-
tial purpose of the human rights regime is to promote and protect vital
human interests, a purpose made evident in the Preamble to each of the two
1966 International Covenants. Today, there is general acceptance of the im-
portance of human rights in the international structure. There are currently
167 parties to the ICCPR and 160 to the ICESCR.
The concept of human rights has expanded exponentially since the end
of World War II and has demonstrated a vibrancy and all-embracing nature.
In the words of David Kennedy, "Humanitarian voices are increasingly
powerful on the international stage." 2 1 Thus, human rights challenge the
16. See supra note 6.
17. U.N. Charter, pmbl.
18. See id.; see also U.N. Charter arts. 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55, 56, 62(2) and 68; See
infra note 53.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
21. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Regime: Still Part of the
Problem?, in EXAMINING CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (Rob Dickin-
son et al. eds., 2012).
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long-established jus cogens norm of sovereignty. As William Twining puts
it:
Either internally or externally . . . municipal law can no longer be
treated in isolation. . . . [T]he twin doctrines of national sovereignty
and non-interference in internal affairs of independent states is being
steadily challenged, most prominently, but not exclusively, by inter-
national humanitarian and human rights law.22
III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The fact that the territorial integrity of the State assumes a paramount
position in international law always needs to be borne in mind when dealing
with the issue of humanitarian intervention. As Jennifer Welsh states, hu-
manitarian intervention can be defined as "coercive interference in the inter-
nal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of
addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread
human suffering." 23
It is possible to distinguish intervention of this nature undertaken by
either States or groups of States, on the one hand, and intervention under
UN auspices, on the other. The former is particularly difficult to reconcile
with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. At most, and on consideration of the
Kosovo crisis of 1999, it can be said that in a crisis, the UN did not con-
demn the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.24
Humanitarian intervention by the UN through the Security Council is a
different matter, bearing in mind the role the Security Council has with
regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. 25 The UN
Security Council has intervened, for example, in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti
and East Timor. 26 Moreover, of relevance is the question whether there is an
obligation on the part of States, or groups of States, to intervene in situa-
tions where there are substantial violations of human rights within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of a State in circumstances where the Security Council
fails to deal with the situation. Examples of Rwanda, Darfur and Kosovo
might be pertinent, 27 as well as Syria at the present time. Nevertheless, se-
22. WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 51 (2000).
23. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs 3 (Jennifer
M. Welsh ed., 2006).
24. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1155-58 (6th ed. 2008).
25. See U.N. Charter, arts. 33-54.
26. KACZOROWSKA, supra note 2, at 732.
27. Id. at 733.
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lective interventions raise questions concerning the concept of human
rights, and, in particular, its "universality."
In recent years, humanitarian intervention has perhaps merged into an
emergent concept of a "responsibility to protect" (R2P). R2P comprises
"the responsibilities to prevent catastrophic situations, to react immediately
when they do occur and to rebuild afterwards." 28 R2P is an important and
influential trend; it "redefine[s] the principle of humanitarian intervention in
a way that seeks to minimi[z]e the motives of the intervening powers .. ."29
In a sense, minimizing intervening states' motives explicitly censure the
State in which the intervention takes place, and, by implication, rebukes and
questions the motives of those who fail to intervene.
The responsibility does not fall on States alone but on the international
community - and with reference to any military action, the principal focus
is on the UN. As a doctrine, R2P can be traced back to 2001:
The concept of R2P entered the legal vocabulary in 2001 when the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) established by the Canadian Foreign Minister in 2000 and
made up of recognised experts in international law published its re-
port entitled "The Responsibility to Protect."30
ICISS' recommendations received endorsement from the UN Secretary-
General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004,
favoring ICISS' conclusion that R2P should be exercised "only with the
endorsement of the Security Council." 3'
Five criteria were identified by the High-Level Panel to assess whether
military intervention is justified:
In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military
force, the Security Council should always address - whatever other
considerations it may take into account - at least the following five
basic criteria of legitimacy:
(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human
security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify
prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal
threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing,
28. SHAw, supra note 24, at 1158.
29. Id.
30. KACZOROWSIA, supra note 2, at 734; See also INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVEN-
TION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), especially the
Synopsis.
31. Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 504,
513 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2010); see also U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 199-203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (December 2004).
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ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanita-
rian law, actual or imminently apprehended?
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the pro-
posed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question,
whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?
(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat
in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing
that other measures will not succeed?
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the
proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the
threat in question?
(e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the mil-
itary action being successful in meeting the threat in question,
with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction? 32
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that the 2005 World
Leaders' Summit adopt R2P, and a text was concluded at the summit. This
was important as the concept and principle was agreed, even though the
final text was weaker than had been proposed. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of
the 2005 World Summit Outcome are relevant:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes,
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations
in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and
other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the
Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate,
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the re-
sponsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
32. Report of Secretary-General, supra note 31, at 207.
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cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing
in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.33
The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1674 of April 28, 2006, reaffirmed
"the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Out-
come Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" and
later that year invoked R2P in relation to Darfur, recalling Resolution "1674
(2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter
alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations
World Summit outcome document . . . ."34
In the Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibil-
ity to Protect,3 5 a three-pillar strategy was outlined for advancing the
agenda mandated by the Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World
Summit, as follows:
Pillar one: the protection responsibilities of the State;
Pillar two: international assistance and capacity-building;
Pillar three: timely and decisive response.
The Report does not provide support for unilateral military interventions:
"[c]ollective action in the use of force must be undertaken with the author-
ity of the Security Council and in accordance with Chapter VII of the
Charter." 36
It is worth bearing in mind that R2P is not enshrined in treaty. So, to
be considered as a norm of international law, its acceptance as part of cus-
tomary international law is the most likely applicable route. Thus, State
practice and opinio juris will be needed.
It is clear from the above that the primary responsibility lies with the
State for protecting its own people. Further, the responsibility of the inter-
national community to protect is only engaged when the State fails in its
33. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
34. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
35. U.N. Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc.
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
36. Zifcak, supra note 31, at 517.
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responsibility. 37 In that case, the principal responsibility of the international
community is to provide aid and assistance with intent to deal with an im-
pending humanitarian crisis. The question, however, is what happens if the
State fails in its responsibility and if the international community's assis-
tance is not effective. It is here that coercive measures - as a last resort -
may include military action authorized by the international community, but
only through the Security Council utilizing in particular its Chapter VII
powers.
The more controversial issue revolves around the question of whether
a State or group of States may intervene for humanitarian purposes in the
event that the Security Council fails to take action. If R2P, through coercive
measures, is only exercisable by the UN Security Council, and if the Perma-
nent Members of the Security Council have a right of veto, can real pro-
gress be made with reference to establishing a norm of R2P? This is an
issue that has found particular resonance in the Arab Spring and has proved
particularly contentious with reference to the situation that has arisen in
Syria.38
In any event, intervention by the international community may not
bring an end to a humanitarian crisis, particularly if that crisis takes the
form of atrocities committed against a particular section of a population; it
may also mean the pattern of atrocities changes, leading to victims coming
from a different sector of society. 39 The international community must con-
sider this issue in all relevant instances. Arguably, the more intractable a
conflict, the greater the ongoing human rights abuses, and failure in the UN
Security Council may exacerbate matters.40 The Responsibility to Protect
should not be seen as a panacea, even if it eventually becomes accepted as a
new norm of international law in the case of humanitarian intervention. 41
Before turning to consider issues of R2P and intervention in the con-
text of the events of the Arab Spring, it is pertinent to give some thought to
matters of self-determination. Ultimately, the issues arising in the States
concerned reflect self-determination, both internal and external.
37. See ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 1 (2011) (stating "[i]f a state "manifestly" fails to protect its population, the
responsibility to do so shifts to the international community").
38. See infra, § V.E.
39. See infra, § V.D.
40. Consider the situation in Syria in February 2012.
41. Indeed, intervention may exacerbate matters; hence, the fifth point (e) identi-
fied by the High-Level Panel, see supra p. 8.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
"Self-determination" connotes images of freedom, yet for many across
the globe it represents nothing but fractured hopes. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to explore issues and conflicts inherent in the theory of self-determi-
nation, prior to examining the theory's applicability to the Arab Spring. The
theory has proven dynamic in its evolution but also limited when measured
against other established norms of international law.
While relatively modem in acceptance as a legal theory, the political
origins of the concept of self-determination go back to the eighteenth cen-
tury and the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French
Revolution of 1789.42 The legal theory traces forward to the twentieth cen-
tury and has had different meanings in different contexts. 4 3 In the aftermath
of the First World War, the League of Nations was established by the victo-
rious Allied Powers, and the League's Covenant, its charter, was approved
at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as part of the Treaty of Versailles.44
The theory of self-determination was "politically popular at the time of
the Peace Settlement of 1919-20 in Europe," and the effect was that minori-
ties who found themselves on "the wrong side of boundaries of new States"
had the option to change their nationality or on occasion were "the subject
of large-scale population transfer and exchange." 4 5 There was not, however,
acceptance of self-determination as a general principle at this time, 46 and it
had different meanings for major actors: it was the essence of a lasting
peace in Europe for U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, yet for Vladimir
Lenin it was "a means of realizing a dream of world-wide socialism." 4 7 The
political implications of and dissonance inherent in self-determination are
thus evident at this early stage.
Essentially, specific provisions defining obligations were incorporated
in the Treaty of Versailles, but these were limited in extent. Despite the
influential authority of Woodrow Wilson, the principle of self-determina-
tion itself "was not specifically included in the Covenant of the League of
42. CASSESE, supra note 3, at 11.
43. Caroline E. Foster, Articulating Self-Determination in the Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 141, 143 (2001).
44. See The Treaty of Peace between the Allied Associated Powers and Germany,
June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
45. IAN BROWNLIE, TREATIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE ROBS LECTURES 4
(1992).
46. Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 1, 5 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
47. CASSESE, supra note 3, at 13.
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Nations." 4 8 It was only those States signing the League's minority treaties
that came under any obligation to the League for the protection of minori-
ties within their borders. In their approach, the League sought to:
. . . suppress in the future those special conditions which give rise to
minority grievances and can arguably legitimate a claim to self-deter-
mination . . . the League [rejected] self-determination and particularly
secessionist self-determination as a further remedy for minority
groups.49
This line was subsequently confirmed by a Commission of Rapporteurs to
the Council of the League of Nations on the Aaland Islands question. There,
the Commissioners stated, to allow minorities to withdraw from the State to
which they belong "would be to destroy order and stability within States
and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a the-
ory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political
entity."50
It was after 1945 that the principle of self-determination was affirmed,
but its application following the Second World War took a different ap-
proach. Then, the theory was applied to "peoples under colonial domina-
tion,"5' initially almost exclusively so. 52 The principle became enshrined in
international law, in particular through Article 1(2) of the United Nations
48. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 64
(1978).
49. Id. at 70. The minority treaties imposed "no general principles of good govern-
ment upon the signatory States . . . They merely [registered] certain conditions which
had to be accepted by a limited number of European States who, as a result of the War,
were receiving political recognition, or great increases in territory, at the hands of the
principal Allied and Associated Powers." Blanche E.C. Dugdale & William A. Bewes,
The Working of the Minority Treaties, 5 J. BRIT. INST. INT'L AFF. 79, 79 (1926). The
policy was to secure equality of citizenship among the inhabitants of the signatory
States, who were to have equal freedom "to practise their own religion, and speak their
own language" and in that way to counteract separatism, yet the minorities themselves
were not parties to the treaties. Id. at 79-80. Particular clauses in the Treaty of Ver-
sailles specified the obligations towards minorities. See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles, supra
note 44, arts. 86, 93 (regarding the "Czecho-Slovak State" and Poland respectively). For
the separate peace treaties concluded, see BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 67-70.
50. BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 71 (quoting The Aaland Islands Question: Report
Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs,
League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921)).
51. James Crawford, Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note
46, at 159, 161.
52. See Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 459, 462 (1971).
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Charter5 3 and subsequently through Article I of the ICCPR.54 In the West-
ern Sahara Case "the Court accepted ... that the principle of self-determi-
nation is a part of customary international law,"55 the emergent norm being
applicable to the decolonization of those non-self-governing territories
under the aegis of the United Nations. 56
The post-Cold War era has seen a further shift in direction for the
principle of self-determination. Further, it is the classification of self-deter-
mination as a general principle rather than a rule, albeit with a number of
customary rules,'57 which opens up the space for ideas and evolution. States
are no longer the sole parties involved in international law, and interpreta-
tion of self-determination by the International Court of Justice in cases such
as East Timor (Portugal v. Australia)8 "has served as a point of entry into
international law for newcomers, the newly returned and even the absent,
and for their challenges to international law's marginalization of them." 59
This interpretation, which may be connected with the decline of the nation-
State, has opened up the door for minorities to argue their case for self-
determination. Thus "external" self-determination, formerly applied to the
colonial situation, is now less commonly the issue. The focus has now
turned towards the right of self-determination to guarantee "internal" self-
determination - a protection of the right "of national or ethnic groups
53. See U.N. Charter, supra note 14, at art. 1(2), 55, 56. Article 1(2) of the Charter
provides that a purpose of the United Nations is: "To develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Self-deter-
mination reappears in Article 55 of the Charter, which commences: "With a view to the
creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples." Both articles represent self-determination as an aim, an
aspiration, rather than a right or an obligation necessarily creating a legal effect, al-
though under Article 56 "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55." See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
54. ICCPR, supra note 19. See also ICESCR, note 20, at art. 1.
55. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 56 (Oct. 16). The U.N.
General Assembly took note "with appreciation" of the International Court of Justice's
Advisory Opinion of the Western Sahara Case. G.A. Res. 3458(XXX), 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3458 (Dec. 10, 1975); See also DAVID HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 108 (7th ed. 2010).
56. See Western Sahara, supra note 55, at 1 54; Harris, supra note 55, at 115.
57. See generally CASSESE, supra note 3, at 126-33.
58. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
59. KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1 10 (2002); See also id. at 206.
2013-2014] 103
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
within the state to assert some degree of 'autonomy' over their affairs, with-
out giving them the right to secede."60 The emphasis on "internal" self-
determination is linked with the democratic decision-making process, 61 and
is less in conflict with the integrity of the State than is "external" self-
determination, although issues surrounding intermeddling in the internal af-
fairs of a State arise in each. It is also the case that few Western colonies
now exist, and it was largely Western colonies to which the doctrine applied
in the post-Second World War era. For the concept of self-determination to
continue to be of significance beyond the context of decolonization, it has
to evolve.
In any event, self-determination is now accepted as a legal principle, 62
a customary legal right, and thus has both legal and political implications.
As is clear, though, the principle has proved contentious: not only in its
content but also in its application. 63 In recent years, and outside the colonial
context, few States have achieved external self-determination through uni-
lateral secession;M one possible exception being Bangladesh and a further
potential example being Kosovo.65
While the nature of external self-determination is evident, as is the
nature of internal self-determination, there is an element at the border of the
two where it is perhaps not clear which will apply. Is, for instance, internal
self-determination sufficient for those claiming self-determination in the
case of Tibet, or perhaps more properly in the case of the Tibet Autono-
mous Region? 66 What of Aceh in Indonesia and Mindanao in the Philip-
pines? Further, schemes of autonomy are viewed as double-edged; schemes
60. GROARKE, supra note 3, at 84; generally; see generally supra note 3 and ac-
companying text.
61. CASSESE, supra note 3, at 64-65.
62. BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 582.
63. Issues such as the definition of "peoples" entitled to the protection of the prin-
ciple. This article is, however, not the place to delve into such matters.
64. See supra note 4.
65. Even in the case of Bangladesh, "[t]he indications are that the United Nations
did not treat the emergence of Bangladesh as a case of self-determination despite good
grounds for doing so, but rather as afait accompli achieved as a result of foreign mili-
tary assistance in special circumstances. The violence and repression engaged in by the
Pakistan military made reunification unthinkable, and in effect legitimi[z]ed the crea-
tion of the new State": CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 415-16. Others, though, believe the
establishment of Bangladesh does come within the principle of self-determination. See,
e.g., Christian Tomuschat, Secession and self-determination, in SECESSION: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 23, 42. As to Kosovo, as yet that entity has
not received international recognition as a State.
66. See, e.g., Rob Dickinson, The Global Reach and Limitations of Self-Determi-
nation, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 384 (2012).
[Vol. 20104
Responsibility to Protect
of autonomy "have been offered to placate secessionist sentiments and
maintain State cohesion, although it is feared such schemes could be a prel-
ude to independence claims, by weakening the central government."67
Instances of entities seeking self-determination at the cusp of internal/
external self-determination are hard cases, and R2P may be seen to operate
here as well as in cases of more clear-cut self-determination. This is some-
thing too that will become visible as we proceed to an examination of the
Arab Spring.
V. THE ARAB SPRING
The 2011 uprisings of the Arab Spring commenced in Tunisia, cat-
alysed by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17,
2010. Popular uprisings spread across the Arab world over the succeeding
months. Initially the uprisings were heralded by much optimism and antici-
pation, particularly as the West sought to encourage the wider expansion of
democracy. In this section, certain States are considered: Tunisia, Egypt,
Bahrain, Libya and Syria. All have been a part of the Arab Spring but the
approach and effects have been different in each.
A. Tunisia
Tunisia was the first of the Arab States to be affected with the death of
one of its citizens, Mohamed Bouazizi. As the uprising unfolded, clashes in
the streets took place between the authorities and the public. The clashes
were fuelled by modern technology as "it is on the internet that a generation
of activists has been credited with enabling the movement to take off."68
The outcome of this internal insurrection was the fall of the "autocratic"
leader of Tunisia, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who sought exile in Saudi
Arabia. 69
67. Li-ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia and Pacific Regions,
in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 297, 331-32 (citing
examples of autonomy offered to Tamil insurrectionists in Sri Lanka, to West Papua
and indeed Aceh by Indonesia, and to Mindanao by the Philippines); see also Photini
Pazartzis, Secession and International Law: the European Dimension, in SECESSION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 355, 373.
68. Aiden Lewis, Tunisia Protests: Cyber War Mirrors Unrest on Streets, BBC
NEws, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 12180954.
69. Marc Fisher, In Tunisia after Arab Spring: New Freedoms Create New Muslim
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Tunisia was the first State to hold elections as a result of the Arab
Spring. Elections took place on October 23, 2011: "Moderate Islamists
claimed victory . . . in Tunisia's first democratic election, sending a mes-
sage to other states in the region that long-sidelined Islamists are challeng-
ing for power after the 'Arab Spring.'"70 There was a massive turnout of
voters as the people embraced change and the future: "'Out of the 4.1 mil-
lion people registered, more than 90 percent voted,' said Boubaker Ben
Thaber, Secretary-General of the independent commission that organized
the vote."7' Thus, Tunisia may truly be seen as an example of a people
determining its own political destiny after the years of autocratic
government.
The outcome, nevertheless, for Tunisia is perhaps less promising than
the flowering of an internal self-determination may have presaged:
But Tunisians are anything but flourishing. Jobs remain scarce, and
the sense of hopelessness that led to the uprising is little abated.
Hardly a day goes by without some new confrontation between Is-
lamists and secular Tunisians. In a country that is nearly 100 percent
Muslim, a growing rift over religion threatens - in the view of the
secular president of the new parliament - to throw Tunisia into
"chaos." 72
To date, the instability created initially in Tunisia has arguably not
resulted in a rebirth of optimism, yet that instability has spread to other
States in the region. It is worth mentioning that there has been no third-
State intervention on the ground in Tunisia and no UN intervention; all
issues in Tunisia have been dealt with internally, with no humanitarian in-
tervention or R2P invocation. The extent of foreign intervention may,
though, be seen through the mass media: "encouragement has come from
abroad, including France and other Arab countries. But much has been gen-
erated from within Tunisia."73 It may be said here that the Tunisian state has
taken responsibility with regard to its citizens, through the power of its citi-
zens leading to the protection of its population. 74 This emphasizes Pillar one
in the three-pillar strategy outlined for advancing the agenda mandated by
70. Tarek Amara & Andrew Hammond, Islamists Claim Win in Tunisia's Arab
Spring Vote, REUTERS, Oct. 24, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
10/24/us-tunisia-election-idUSTRE79L28820111024.
71. Tarek Amara & Christian Lowe, Huge Turnout in Tunisia's Arab Spring Elec-
tion, REUTERS, Oct 23, 2011 available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/23/us-
tunisia-election-idUSTRE79L28820111023.
72. Fisher, supra note 69.
73. Lewis, supra note 68.
74. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 33, at [ 138.
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the Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit: the protec-
tion responsibilities of the State.75 The benefits of the internal Tunisian
revolution have yet to become manifest despite the democratic outcome.
B. Egypt
Egypt was seen as something of a bellwether so far as the Arab States
were concerned in the context of the Arab Spring. The outcome for Presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak was seen as crucial: "All of [the Arab rulers] now
watch Egypt's 'days of rage' with mounting trepidation. In the fate of the
ailing Egyptian ruler, 82-year-old Hosni Mubarak, they see their own. 76
Egypt, of course, was a State that had received Western backing as "for
decades, American and European leaders chose stability over democracy."77
Western leaders were now reluctant to see the downfall of a friendly gov-
ernment in the Middle-East. Mubarak was not a democratically-elected
leader yet, and as countless Egyptians protested against his government in
the focal point of Cairo, Tahrir Square, the reluctance of the West to inter-
vene was palpable.
Activists in Egypt organized a demonstration against the government
on January 25, 2011.78 Protests spread across the country and, after eighteen
days of mass demonstrations, Hosni Mubarak resigned the presidency on
February 11, 2011, handing power over to the army.79 At that time: "U.S.
president Barack Obama, who had supported Mubarak remaining in power
until a stable transitional administration was in place, called on the new
military leaders to take concrete steps towards democratic change."80
75. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
76. Roger Hardy, Egypt Protests: an Arab Spring as Old Order Crumbles? BBC
NEWS, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12339521; The
fate of Hosni Mubarak was announced on June 2, 2012 - "An Egyptian court ...
sentenced former President Hosni Mubarak to life in prison as an accomplice in the
killing of unarmed demonstrators during the protests that ended his nearly 30-year
rule." David D. Kirkpatrick, New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/world/middleeast/
egypt-hosni-mubarak-life-sentence-prison.html?r= I &pagewanted=all.
77. Hardy, supra note 76.
78. Dina Shehata, The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to
an End, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 26, 26.
79. Chris McGreal & Jack Shenker, Hosni Mubarak resigns - and Egypt cele-
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It was not until November 29, 2011 that Egypt held parliamentary
elections which took place in the midst of widespread violence and unrest.81
In the period prior to the election, thousands of protesters had violently
clashed with the interim military-led government, arguing that demands
from the original January protests had still to be addressed. 82 Just as the
Mubarak government had Western support, so did the interim government.
It was only on November 25, 2011 that the Obama Administration modified
its stance:
Early on the morning of Nov. 25, the Obama administration signifi-
cantly shifted its public position in the then-ongoing standoff be-
tween Egypt's ruling military and pro-democracy demonstrators in
Cairo's Tahrir square. Dropping its weak appeals for 'restraint on all
sides,' the White House 'condemned the excessive use of force'
against the protesters and sided with their main demand by asserting
that 'the full transfer of power to a civilian government must take
place . . . as soon as possible.'83
In the elections, which were conducted in three phases over a six-
week period, the Islamist parties were successful and achieved 67
percent of the total vote.84 Presidential elections took place in May
81. Big turnout in Egypt post-Mubarak election, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15932733; see, e.g., Egypt: violent protests
spread to Alexandria, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/890572 1/Egypt-violent-protests-spread-
to-Alexandria.html.
82. Jack Shenker, Egypt: violent clashes in Cairo leave two dead and hundreds
injured, GUARDIAN, Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/201 1/nov/19/
egypt-violent-clashes-cairo-injured.
83. Jackson Diehl, Obama is lagging on Egypt, WASH. PosT, Dec. 11, 2011, http:
//articles.washingtonpost.com/22011-12-11 /opinions/35285463_1jay-carney-obama-ad
ministration-president-obama.
84. Jasmine Coleman, Egypt election results show firm win for Islamists, GUARD-
IAN, Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/2I/egypt-election-clean-
islamist-victory; The Lower House of Egypt's parliament was subsequently dissolved
following a constitutional court ruling on June 14, 2012. See Edmund Blair, Egypt par-
liament to be dissolved after ruling: court official, REUTERS, June 14, 2012, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-egypt-court-dissolution-idUKBRE85DOXT201206
14. Thus a new election will have to be held and a state of flux prevails. Indeed, on Dec.
20, 2012, "Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi appointed 90 new members to the 270-
member Shura Council. The body will now assume full legislative powers until the
elevtion of a new lower house of parliament - the House of Representatives." Egypt's
New Shura Council, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, CARNEGIE ENDOW-




and June 2012, and the Muslim Brotherhood candidate was
victorious. 85
The case of Egypt, from the point of view of the attitude of Western
States, was one of reluctance to see the protesters and their will prevail over
the status quo. Political reasons were to the fore here and there was lack of
intervention. So, if the three-pillar strategy advanced regarding R2P is ap-
plied here, protection responsibilities were clearly left to the State, Egypt.
However, it is doubtful if they acted in compliance and in January 2012,
Human Rights Watch reported a catalogue of abuses in Egypt all of which
had taken place in the previous twelve months. The report included the
following:
In October, soldiers ran over demonstrators with armored cars and
shot them, killing 27 marchers at a Christian rally held to protest the
burning of a church. In November, at least 40 demonstrators were
killed by anti-riot forces during unrest in and around Tahrir Square,
the epicenter of protest. Police routinely beat demonstrators, women
included. Human Rights Watch has documented torture and abuse of
detainees by soldiers. Military personnel carried out abusive "virgin-
ity tests" on women in detention. Servile state media demonize oppo-
sition groups and non-governmental organizations as subversive tools
of dark foreign forces.86
It is clear that if the universality of human rights is to be respected in
situations such as these, UN commitment is required and this is difficult if
political imperatives of third States - particularly powerful third States -
dictate to the contrary. Here, we see political imperatives of powerful West-
ern States, the US, for example, being concerned with the wider picture in
the Middle-East and being unwilling to risk the loss of Egypt as an ally
through regime change. We shall later see different political imperatives at
work, in the context of Syria, and a rather different angle on regime change
in the context of Libya.
With Egypt, it is arguable that the doctrines of sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States were not successfully challenged
by international humanitarian and human rights law,8 7 and similarly so, in-
deed, in Tunisia. It is of course right that such doctrines should not be easily
challenged: if they were to be, there would be clear and ever-present risks to
85. Ian Black, Mohamed Morsi victory unsettles Middle East neighbours, THE
GUARDIAN, June 25, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/25/mohamed-
morsi-middle-east-neighbours?INTCMP=SRCH.
86. Daniel Williams, No Joy in Egypt, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 25, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/25/no-joy-egypt.
87. Cf. Twining, supra note 22.
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international peace, security and stability. Nevertheless, has the interna-
tional community shirked its responsibilities in regard to Egypt? Should it
have taken steps to help protect the population of that country? In other
words, would it have been appropriate to assist effectively with interna-
tional assistance and capacity building?88
However, if the international community might be perceived to have
made a minimal response only to the wave of protest in Egypt, its silence
and lack of condemnation rang loud with reference to Bahrain.
C. Bahrain
The protests in Bahrain have singularly failed to attract international
support. It was in February 2011 that protests reached Bahrain, with demon-
strations against the ruling Al-Khalifa family. Protesters were forcibly re-
moved and three died along with one policeman. Roadblocks manned by
armed vigilantes were subsequently erected and after four weeks a state of
emergency was put into effect.89 Of particular note is the role of Saudi
Arabia:
On March 14th, at the request of Bahrain's ruling Sunni Al-Khalifa
family, Saudi Arabia, leading a special contingent under the aegis of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, a league of Sunni-led Gulf states,
rolled in its troops into Bahrain. The force violently quelled protests
instigated by Bahrain's Shiite majority that were supposedly centered
on demands for political and economic reforms.90
The ferment in Bahrain was not met, therefore, with external sympathy
but with external support for the government, a government in which power
was concentrated in an appointed upper chamber. 91 Further, Western sup-
port for the Bahraini regime was evident. Britain, for example, a long-
88. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 35, at 15-22.
89. Peter Pearson, Bahrain and the Arab Spring: time for some realism, THE TELE-
GRAPH, Aug. 4, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/
8681885/Bahrain-and-the-Arab-Spring-time-for-some-realism.html.
90. Machla Abramovitz, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the "Arab Spring," ISRAZINE,
July 21, 2011, http://www.isranet.org/israzine/saudi-arabia-bahrain-and-arab-springledi-
torial/.
91. Pearson, supra note 89.
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standing friend of Bahrain,92 spoke out in support of the regime, 93 and the
United States was perceived to be complicit in the crackdown. 94
The politics of the Middle-East rather than human rights can be seen as
key with regard to Bahrain. There were reports such as:
[A]s many as 30 people are thought to have been killed [in Bahrain]
as anti-government demonstrations have been violently suppressed.
Hundreds of protesters have been detained and employees have been
dismissed from state-owned enterprises in a move to purge dissent.95
Notwithstanding, the fear is one of Iran and advancing influence of Tehran:
advancing influence in Bahrain through Shiite opposition, which Saudi Ara-
bia - "the main strategic bulwark against Iranian power" - opposes. 96 Pro-
tests continued in 2012 and, for example, it was reported in May 2012, "[A]
prominent human rights activist and critic of Bahrain's ruling family has
been arrested." 97 The previous month, "Bahraini protestors [had] claimed a
moral victory against the government in their campaign to focus attention
on tensions and repression in the Gulf state, despite failing to disrupt the
controversial Formula One grand prix." 98
In the context of Bahrain, there has been international interference -
but in support of a regime cracking down on internal protest. No interven-
tion has been humanitarian in nature. Coercive measures by States in sup-
port of the Bahraini regime may be seen in the context of maintaining
92. Id.
93. Bahrain: We must speak out about brutality in the Gulf, GUARDIAN, Apr. 16,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/20 11/apr/17/observer-editorial-britain-
role-in-gulf -"William Hague, foreign secretary, was keen to recognise 'important po-
litical reforms' which he welcomed in the context of "the long friendship between
Bahrain and the UK."
94. Alexander Cooley & Daniel H. Nexon, Bahrain's Base Politics, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67700/alexander-cooley-
and-daniel-h-nexon/bahrains-base-politics.
95. THE GUARDIAN, supra note 93.
96. Id. Space does not permit a discussion of the major differences between the
Sunni and Shia denominations of Islam.
97. Bahrain human rights activist arrested as crackdown escalates, GUARDIAN,
May 6, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/06/bahrain-human-rights-ac-
tivist-arrested.
98. Ian Black, Bahrain Grand Prix fails to drown out angry protests, GUARDIAN,
Apr. 22, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/22/bahrain-grand-prix-angry-
protests.
2013-2014] 111
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTs LAW REVIEW
international peace and security, and a maintenance of stability. 99 The po-
tential limitations of any emerging doctrine of R2P are all too evident.
D. Libya
In Bahrain intervention by the international community was in support
of the incumbent regime. However, this was not the case in Libya, the
fourth State the subject of discussion in this article. The protests that ulti-
mately led to the downfall and death of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, began
in Benghazi on February 15, 2011: "Hundreds of anti-government protes-
ters have clashed with police and government supporters in Libya's second
city, in the latest display of unrest in the Arab world. Dozens of people are
said to have been hurt in the clashes in Benghazi." 00 The protests escalated,
and on February 21, for example, "Protesters in Libya's capital [were] re-
ported to have set fire to government buildings and attacked the headquar-
ters of state television as the anti-Gaddafi demonstrations that began in the
east of the country threaten to engulf the regime."o'0 A matter of days later,
the National Transitional Council was established:
An interim opposition government, later named the National Transi-
tional Council (NTC) was established on 26 February 2011 under the
leadership of former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the first
government official to break ties with Gaddafi. The NTC was eventu-
ally universally accepted as the governing body of Libya, first by the
Contact Group on 25 August 2011, then the League of Arab States on
27 August, the UN General Assembly on 16 September and the Afri-
can Union on 20 September.102
As the crisis evolved matters were considered by the UN Security
Council. By resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17, 2011,103
member States were authorized 'to take all necessary measures . . . to pro-
tect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Lib-
99. It is worth noting Art. 2(3) of the UN Charter: "All members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
100. Libya protests: Second city Benghazi hit by violence, BBC NEWS, Feb. 16,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12477275.
101. Ian Black & Matthew Taylor, Libya protesters set fire to government build-
ings in Tripoli, GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201/feb/
21/libya-protesters-fire-government-tripoli?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
102. The Crisis in Libya, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTEcT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last
visited May 21, 2012) [hereinafter ICRTOP].
103. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
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yan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory . . . ."10 A ban
on all flights in Libyan airspace was established to help protect civilians. 05
A coalition of States, including 15 NATO countries, formed to implement
this no-fly zone:
The Coalition successfully provided support to NTC forces in Ben-
ghazi and Misrata and then later in Libya's capital Tripoli, Gaddafi's
hometown Sirte, and other loyalist strongholds in Libya. Crimes
against humanity committed by pro-Gaddafi forces continued until 24
October 2011 when NTC officials declared the end of the eight-
month conflict in Libya following the death of Gaddafi and his son
Mutassim on 20 October. The NATO mission ended on 31 October
as the UN Security Council voted unanimously on 26 October [sic] to
end the no-fly zone in Libya. 06
The outcome for Libya was regime change and the death of Colonel
Gaddafi - the end of his dictatorial regime. Postponed elections were held
on July 7, 2012.107 It is of interest in the context of self-determination, that
"parties based on religion, tribe or ethnicity" were banned from standing in
those elections. 08
The situation in Libya, and its resolution, is notable for the fact that the
international community chose to intervene against the regime that was the
object of the revolution. Intervention was not wholehearted: for instance,
UN Security Council resolution 1973 was not unanimous and five States
abstained, including China and the Russian Federation. 0 9 Nevertheless, in-
tervention did take place and regime change was the outcome. The motive
for intervention was said to be humanitarian, to protect civilians,"10 so mini-
104. Id. 4.
105. Id. 6.
106. ICRTOP, supra note 102. The provisions relating to the no-fly zone were
terminated by Resolution 2016, adopted by the Security Council at its 6640th meeting,
on October 27, 2011; see S.C. Res. 2016, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011).
107. Marie-Lousie Gumuchian, Libya postpones landmark election to July 7,
REUTERS, June 10, 2013, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/10/us-libya-
vote-date-idUSBRE8590A220120610.
108. Hadeel Al-Shalchi, Libya bans religious, tribal or ethnic parties, REUTERS,
Apr. 25, 2012, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/libya-election-
idINDEE83009020120425.
109. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves "No-Fly Zone"
over Libya, Authorizing "All Necessary Measures" to Protect Civillians, by Vote of 10
in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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mizing the motives of the intervening powers."' Yet, it is difficult to di-
vorce the intervention from the fact that Western powers had an axe to
grind with reference to Muammar Gaddafi over the years.' 12
While the terms of UN Security Council resolution 1973 may be seen
as a proportionate response to a serious humanitarian threat, it may be ques-
tioned as to whether the action taken by the coalition went further than
envisaged in the resolution. It is this issue that came into focus in the con-
text of the response by the international community to the uprising in Syria.
It is clear that in Libya the state failed to protect its own people; it is equally
clear that one result of the intervention by the international community was
a change in the pattern of atrocities - victims coming from a different sector
of society." 3
E. Syria
Protest came rather later to Syria and commenced in March 2011,
when "[h]undreds of Syrians . . . staged a rare protest in the capital, Damas-
cus, calling for democratic reforms and the release of all political prison-
ers.""l4 In January 2011, President Bashar al-Assad had "said that there was
no chance of political upheaval, and pledged to press on with a package of
reforms."" Violence quickly became the hallmark of the Syrian uprising.
For example, in the Sunni Syrian city of Hama:
[O]ver 70 [residents] were shot dead during protests on June 3rd
[2011]. Fearing escalation beyond its control, the regime temporarily
pulled out most forces. Free to protest, tens of thousands took to the
I11. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
112. For example, consider the US air strikes against Libya in 1986 - "President
Reagan . . . justified the attacks by accusing Libya of direct responsibility for terrorism
aimed at America, such as the bombing of La Belle discoteque in West Berlin 10 days
ago." On This Day 1950-2005: 1986: US launches air strikes on Libya, BBC NEWS
Apr. 15, 1986, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/1 5/newsid_
3975000/3975455.stm; Consider too the Lockerbie air disaster of December 21, 1988,
for which the Libyan agent, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, was convicted. Michelle Nichols,
Justice served by Gaddafi death, Lockerbie famiilies say, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2011,
available at http:www.uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/uk-libya-gaddafi-lockerbie-
idUKTRE79J51520111020.
113. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; Hardy, supra note 76. Note, for
example, the death of Colonel Gaddafi reported by Reuters. Tim Gaynor & Taha
Zargoun, Gaddafi's death - who pulled the trigger?, REUTERS, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-libya-gaddafi-finalhours-idUSTRE79J5Q720111020.
114. Mid-East unrest: Syrian Protests in Damascus and Aleppo, BBC NEWS, Mar.




streets. Some reports suggest 300,000 people, including women and
children, turned out on Friday July Ist, the biggest protest to date."' 6
Then, "On July 3rd, having sacked the provincial governor, who was
widely liked in Hama, armed troops returned to the city and resumed their
campaign of violent intimidation, killing at least 24 demonstrators over the
next two days."" 7
Violence was such that the Arab League, with Syrian agreement,
deployed peace monitors in December 2011,118 and it was reported that
"[n]ewly-arrived Arab League peace monitors will try Tuesday to see for
themselves the situation in the Syrians [sic] city of Homs, which opponents
of President Bashar al-Assad say has been pulverized by government troops
and tanks in recent days.""l9 Civil war became a significant fear, and a civil
war along sectarian lines, raising issues of internal, and potentially external,
self-determination:
An armed insurgency is eclipsing civilian protest in Syria. Many fear
a slide to sectarian war between the Sunni Muslim majority, the driv-
ing force of the protest movement, and minorities that have mostly
stayed loyal to the government, particularly the Alawite sect to which
Assad belongs.
Analysts say the Arab League is anxious to avoid civil war. The West
has shown no desire to intervene militarily and the United Nations
Security Council is split.120
The Arab League's mission was of short duration as violence continued
despite the presence of the monitors,121 and questions were quickly raised as
to the appropriateness of the leader of the mission, the Sudanese general
116. Syrian rebellion: Sledge Hama, EcONOMIST, July 7, 2011, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/1 8929220?story-id=18929220.
117. Id.
118. See Erika Solomon, Arab Observers aim to see Syria's deadliest city,
REUTERS, Dec. 26, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/26/us-
syria-idUSTRE7BOOB620111226; Syria had responded positively to the Arab League's
plan allowing access to monitors. See Syria responds 'positively' to Arab League deal
as it holds war games in show of force, AL ARABIYA NEWS, Dec. 5, 2011, http://www.
alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/05/180867.html.
119. Solomon, supra note 118.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Syria violence continues despite observer mission, ABC NEWS,
Dec. 30, 2011, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-12-29/syria-violence-continues-
despite-arab-league-observers/3751810.
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Mustafa al-Dabi, and the killings continued.12 2 The mission failed to end the
violence and it was suspended at the end of January 2012.123
UN Security Council involvement failed to follow the tenor of its in-
volvement in Libya. The issue of intervention has been raised in the UN
Security Council where a Security Council resolution was vetoed by Russia
and China.124 The resolution had not even made mention of questioning
Assad's hold on power and, for example, made no mention of "sanctions
nor any other punitive action, or blocking arms deliveries - Russia is As-
sad's most important supplier." 25 Russia also feared the resolution masked
objectives of "global domination" and regime change,12 6 echoing the
thought that the coalition went further than envisaged in the Security Coun-
cil resolution acted upon regarding Libya.127 However, "[a]n angry response
by American Ambassador Susan Rice reflected the frustration of the U.S.
that even a diluted Resolution - which had removed all sanctions and an
arms embargo - could not pass." 28
In the wake of continuing violence, the UN Security Council in April
2012 agreed to establish the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
122. See, e.g., Syria: human right groups challenge leadership of Arab League
mission, GUARDIAN, Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/
syria-arab-league-observer-mission; Kareem Fahim, Chief of Arab League Mission in
Syria is Lightning Rod for Criticism, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 2, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/01/03/world/middleeast/arab-league-criticized-over-syria-observer-
mission.html?pagewanted=all
123. See Syria unrest: Arab League observer mission head quits, BBC NEWS, Feb.
12, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17001032.
124. See Draft S.C. Res. S/2012/77; see also SCOR, 6711 th Mtg., UN. Doc. S/
PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2012); Press Release Security Council, "Security Council Fails To
Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China veto text supporting
Arab League's proposed peace plan," U.N. Press Release SC/10536 (Feb. 4, 2012).
125. Ian Black, Russia's veto on Syria sidelines UN as diplomatic options run out,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 4, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/russia-syria-un-
resolution-veto; Note that in June 2012, in the context of the supply of helicopter gun-
ships, Russia's foreign minister stated that Russia "will continue to fulfil contracts to
supply weapons to Syria." Roland Oliphant, Ruth Sherlock, & Adrian Blomfield, Syria:
Russia sends back ship loaded with helicopters, TELEGRAPH, June 21, 2012, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9347826/Syria-Russia-sends-
back-ship-loaded-with-helicopters.html#.
126. Prensa Latina, Syria: Russia and China chain the dogs of war, PRAVDA,
Feb. 7, 2012, http://english.pravda.ru/russialpolitics/07-02-2012/120431-Russia and_
China chain_the-dogsof war-0/.
127. See supra note 103; see section V.D. on Libya, above.





(UNSMIS).1 29 Clearly there is no appetite in the UN Security Council for
intervention in Syria beyond a small supervisory monitoring mission. It
must be noted that on August 19, 2012, the UNSMIS mandate ended due to
the failure of the parties to meet conditions that would allow the monitors to
implement the mandate.130
The situation in Syria remains volatile and the hands of the interna-
tional community are tied in circumstances where there is disagreement
among veto-wielding members of the Security Council as to the line to be
followed. This may be contrasted with the situation in Libya, where no
veto-wielding members of the Security Council exercised their veto al-
though two did abstain with regard to resolution 1973.131 So, in Syria, there
is no intervention under UN auspices and a supervisory mission only has
been agreed.
As to the question of R2P, if we consider the three-pillar strategy man-
dated by the Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit, it
is clear that Syria has abrogated its protection responsibilities; even after the
inception of the supervisory mission, violence continued: "[t]he United Na-
tions accused both sides of breaching the truce and said it had credible
reports that at least 34 children had been killed since the accord took effect
on April 12."132 The international community, although tardily, took some
steps to protect the Syrian population from violence through the advent of
the supervisory mission; yet the value of even those small steps remains
questionable in view of the terminal difficulties encountered by this
mission.133
Politics within the Security Council has proved conclusive, however,
in the failure to achieve a resolution condemning the Syrian regime. This
factor will be addressed in the concluding section to this article. Neverthe-
less, it needs to be borne in mind that intervention by the international com-
munity in the affairs of a State against its territorial integrity should always
129. See S.C. Res. 2043, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012). UNSMIS was
initially established for a period of 90 days; its mandate "to monitor a cessation of
armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full imple-
mentation of the Envoy's six-point proposal,"( 6). By 1 3 of the resolution, "all parties
in Syria, including the opposition, [were called upon] immediately to cease all armed
violence in all its forms."
130. See UNSMIS, Monitoring a cessation of armed violence in all its forms,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unsmis (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
131. See U.N. Press Release SC/10200, supra note 109.
132. Erika Solomon, Syria violence kills 23, U.N. criticizes both sides, REUTERS,
May 1, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/01/us-syria-
idUSBRE83TOD320120501.
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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be proportional and as a last resort. This despite the fact that, under the third
pillar of the R2P strategy mandated by the Heads of State and Government
at the 2005 World Summit, it should be a timely and decisive response once
peaceful means have "manifestly" failed. 134
VI. CONcLusIoN
This article has latterly concentrated on the events of the Arab Spring
in a number of countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. In this
concluding section, these events will be related particularly to issues of hu-
manitarian intervention, and R2P, in a context of self-determination. Inter-
nal self-determination especially is to the fore as the people of these States
rise up against the governments in power. The point has been made that
States have obligations as to the human rights of their people and that if a
State fails in this respect, the international community may question its ter-
ritorial integrity.135 Consequently, a State failing to govern for all may lose
legitimacy, and it is this legitimacy that seems to have been lost by govern-
ments in States that have felt the force of the Arab Spring.
It is certain that politics is never far from the center of the debate: both
politics within the States most concerned and that of the international envi-
ronment. Remarks of Raymond Aron are apposite: "[p]olitics, insofar as it
concerns relations among states, seems to signify - in both ideal and objec-
tive terms - simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat
created by the existence of other states', and further - perhaps particularly -
that:
[i]f a province, an integrated portion of the state's territory or a frac-
tion of the population, refuses to submit to the centralized power and
undertake [sic] an armed struggle, the conflict, though civil war with
regard to international law, will be considered a foreign war by those
who see the rebels as the expression of an existing or nascent
nation.136
In this regard, the distinction between international and internal matters be-
comes blurred. Further, issues of internal self-determination, if not ad-
dressed, may turn into a move for external self-determination, and thus may
134. See U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, supra note 33; As to the three-pillar strategy, see
U.N. Doc. A/63/677, supra note 35. In this regard, note the five criteria identified by the
High-Level Panel to assess whether military intervention is justified; See U.N. Doc. A/
59/565, supra note 32.
135. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
136. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE & WAR 6-7 (Richard Howard & Annette Baker,
Fox trans., Doubleday & Company ed. 1966) (emphasis added).
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be a prelude to independence claims, further weakening the central govern-
ment of the State.'37
This article raises important issues of governmental legitimacy as well
as external interference in the affairs of a State. The very survival of a State
may be in question as a result of revolution and insurrection. It is clear that
a people do have a right to revolt and it is equally clear that this right may
be linked with secession. As Lee Buchheit remarks:
In the end, one is left with the thought that remedial secession
merely affirms a basic right of revolution by oppressed peoples; and
this has long been thought to be one of those "inalienable" rights
which the international community could neither bestow nor
revoke.138
It is because issues of internal revolution may in turn lead to claims for
external self-determination at its logical extreme of secession that the upris-
ings of the Arab Spring need to be treated circumspectly by the interna-
tional community.'39 Generally, as we have seen, the international
community has exercised caution - although this caution may be seen to be
the result of political differences between veto-wielding permanent mem-
bers of the UN Security Council.14 0 Humanitarian intervention should not
be exercised lightly as it may involve "coercive interference."'41 Therefore,
the doctrine of R2P is one where, particularly, timely and decisive response
needs to be thought through carefully in each individual case.142 The doc-
trine should be seen neither as a panacea nor a definitive answer.
In Tunisia, where the Arab Spring may be said to have originated,
prompting uprisings elsewhere, matters were in essence dealt with inter-
nally and protection responsibilities were managed within the State. Elec-
tions have subsequently taken place, yet there are still causes for concern.
The first of these is that violent clashes have not ceased:
Tunisia's Islamist-led government on Wednesday reversed a ban on
protests on the capital's central thoroughfare after an outcry over a
violent police crackdown there this week.
137. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
138. BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 223.
139. This is aside from issues of intervening against the territorial integrity of
States.
140. This is most evident with reference to the reaction of the international com-
munity to the uprising in Syria. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
142. As to "timely and decisive response," see supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
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It also began an investigation into the crackdown. The police used
tear gas and batons to disperse stone-throwing protesters who
stormed Habib Bourguiba Avenue on Monday, in defiance of a ban
on rallies on a street that was a focal point of protests that ousted Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali from the presidency last year.143
It is therefore too early to say what the outcome will be for Tunisia, stability
is by no means assured, and a second point of concern becomes relevant in
this regard. This point is the fact that Tunisia now has an Islamist govern-
ment - albeit a moderate one. In this context it is noted: "[p]oliticians and
activists from the secular opposition have compared the police tactics to
those of Mr. Ben Ali's police state, when freedom was severely cur-
tailed."'" A potential religious rift threatens within Tunisia and the out-
come for Tunisia must remain uncertain as internal clashes continue and a
"sense of hopelessness" remains.145 The importance of pillar two of the
three-pillar strategy outlined in the Report of the Secretary-General, Imple-
menting the Responsibility to Protect,14 6 should be emphasized.
As to Egypt, we have already identified that here protection responsi-
bilities were left to the State. Yet the overthrow of President Hosni
Mubarak and the subsequent parliamentary elections have not brought an
end to human rights infringements.14 7 Political imperatives of third States
ensured a lack of intervention by the international community against the
former regime and, if stability is to be maintained in Egypt, again it is nec-
essary to emphasize pillar two of the strategy as above and the context of
R2P becomes of direct relevance. As to the protection responsibilities of the
State itself towards its citizens it will be interesting to judge the ultimate
effect of the result of the 2012 presidential election.148




145. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 35.
147. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also supra note 84.
148. See generally Ian Black, Egypt approaches first free presidential election
with trepidation, GUARDIAN, May 18, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
may/18/egypt-first-free-presidential-election; It is also interesting that: 'Strikingly, all
the leading candidates have so far been deferential in their statements on the military
and their jealously guarded status, secret budgets and economic empire. That suggests
they will continue to wield considerable power behind the scenes, whoever ends up
occupying the presidential palace. See supra note 81 and accompanying text ("The win-
ning Presidential candidate proved to be Mohamed Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood").
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What differentiates Bahrain from the previous two studies is the fact
that there was intervention by the international community. However, this
was not humanitarian intervention, nor was it intervention based on R2P.
Far from being in support of the protesters, the intervention was in support
of the regime. Bahrain may be seen, then, to reflect one of the limitations on
R2P: a political limitation whereby States are unlikely to intervene if it is
not in their interest to do so. With regard to Bahrain, wider politics dictated
against intervention and for maintenance of the status quo: to have inter-
vened against the regime may have endangered international peace and se-
curity.149 Here, politics can be seen to trump human rights, bringing sharply
into focus and question the universality of human rights.
The international response to the situation pertaining in Libya was en-
tirely different. Intervention by the international community, on resolution
of the UN Security Council,o50 was in support of the uprising and against
the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, whose government was seen to
be illegitimate. The Security Council mandated "all necessary measures" in
the protection of civilians.'5 ' The success of the international coalition led
to regime change and the death of Gaddafi in an unsavory manner, and,
raising sectarian issues, the pattern of atrocities changed as a result of the
intervention. The international community did intervene for humanitarian
reasons, although that is not to say there may not have been other relevant
reasons, 5 2 and it can be argued the intervention was timely and decisive.153
It is not clear, however, that this intervention in a context of R2P has
proven to be a panacea when taking into consideration the shift in violence
to take place against another sector of society.
The last of the studies above referred to Syria. In this regard, the inter-
national community has been unable to agree on intervention except in the
form of peace monitors, initially through the offices of the Arab League,
and subsequently under UN auspices. Politics has dominated within the UN
Security Council and the UN response has been anything other than deci-
sive. So, again, R2P and humanitarian intervention more generally have
proven to be idealistic and utopian rather than a panacea as violence has
continued and the regime has sought, through its military, to retain its hold
on power. It is right that there should be no rush towards a rash intervention
149. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 103.
15 1. Id.
152. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; (pillar three of the three-pillar
strategy outlined in the Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibil-
ity to Protect).
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in a State by the international community. However, the reaction to events
in Syria does raise questions of the extent of human rights abuses required
before there should be coercive intervention against a State failing to pro-
tect the rights of its citizens. There is a further question of the viability and
efficacy of a Security Council constrained by Permanent Members holding
veto powers and who are able to block resolutions, for example, leading to
humanitarian intervention.15 4
The Arab Spring has seen the legitimacy of governments questioned
and has seen interference in the internal affairs of a State, Libya, leading to
the downfall of its regime. It has also seen a regime desperately fighting for
its survival and, in so doing, compromising the well-being of its people:
Syria. It has seen a further State, Bahrain, enlist the support of foreign
States to suppress an uprising by its own people. In all the States examined
issues of self-determination arise as do questions of when to intervene for
humanitarian purposes. Regime change itself can of course potentially cre-
ate new problems, for example, with reference to the Islamist regimes now
in place in Egypt and Tunisia, and, where insurrection is unsuccessful yet
abuses continue in cases where sectarian issues arise, the spectre ultimately
of external self-determination may materialize.'55
The emerging doctrine of R2P has a role to play with reference to
humanitarian intervention and can be seen to be of relevance in the context
of the Arab Spring in support of a repressed population suffering human
rights abuses at the hands of the State and provoked to protest and insurrec-
tion. The three-pillar strategy invoked by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations is a significant contribution and the first two pillars thereof
are particularly relevant: the protection responsibilities of the State, and in-
ternational assistance and capacity building.'56 However, States seeking to
intervene through the authority of the UN Security Council need to be cau-
tious. They need to bear in mind that the more intractable a dispute the
more difficult it is to solve. As Henry Kissinger states, "the frequent out-
come of revolution is an increase in central power; the more sweeping the
154. Although, particularly in the context of Syria, it is necessary to ask the ques-
tion posed in the fifth of the criteria identified by the High-Level Panel in 2004 to
assess whether military intervention is justified - is there a reasonable chance of the
military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences
of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
155. This may be relevant in the context of both Syria and Bahrain, where vio-
lence can be perceived to have sectarian connotations. See supra note 96 and accompa-
nying text; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 35.
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revolution, the more this is true."'5 7 Such comments resonate, for instance,
in Syria today and States, particularly Western States for which humanita-
rian intervention is much in focus, should exercise caution in their
approach. 58
157. HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 336 (2011).
158. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

